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Abstract
I entertain a generalization of the standard Bolzmann-Gibbs-Shannon measure of entropy in multi-
plier preferences of model uncertainty. Using this measure, I derive a generalized exponential cer-
tainty equivalent, which nests the exponential certainty equivalent of the standard Hansen-Sargent
model uncertainty formulation and the power certainty equivalent of the popular Epstein-Zin-Weil
recursive preferences as special cases. Besides providing a model uncertainty rationale to these
risk-sensitive preferences, the generalized exponential equivalent provides additional flexibility in
modeling uncertainty through its introduction of pessimism into agents, causing them to overweight
events made more likely in the worst case model when forming expectations. In a standard neo-
classical growth model, I close the gap to the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds with plausible detection
error probabilities using the generalized exponential equivalent and show that Hansen-Sargent and
Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences yield comparable market prices of risk for given detection error prob-
abilities.
JEL classification: C61, C63, E17
Keywords: model uncertainty; robust control; recursive preferences; equity premium puzzle; Tsallis
entropy
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1 Introduction
Model uncertainty in macroeconomic models (see Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2010) and the detailed
treatment in the monograph Hansen and Sargent (2007)) places agents in an decision environment
riddled with unstructured, Knightian uncertainty that leads to agents forming their decision rules to
be robust to a worst case (i.e., welfare minimizing) model. With agents making intertemporal deci-
sions such as investment in an environment where they distrust the models they use to form expec-
tations about the future, Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) show that a modest amount of model
uncertainty can substitute for a high degree of risk aversion. Tallarini (2000), Barillas, Hansen,
and Sargent (2009), and Ju and Miao (2012) among others have emphasized the close relationship
between model uncertainty preferences and risk-sensitive preferences such as the popular Epstein
and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) recursive, constant elasticity preferences.1 Yet an equivalence has
only been demonstrated for the specific case of a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This
limitation arises due to the differing functional forms of the certainty equivalents in these prefer-
ences (exponential for Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) model uncertainty and power for Epstein and
Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) risk-sensitive preferences). Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2005) ob-
serve that it is an open question whether the power certainty equivalent underlying Epstein and Zin’s
(1989) and Weil’s (1990) risk-sensitive preferences can be given a model uncertainty foundation that
relates the two sets of preferences beyond the known special case.
In this paper, I propose an answer to this open question by generalizing the statistics of model
uncertainty preferences beyond the logarithmic Bolzmann-Gibbs-Shannon measure of entropy to
the measure introduced by Tsallis (1988) for nonextensive statistical mechanics in thermodynamics.
Alongside a generalized exponential certainty equivalent, I derive a power certainty equivalent from
model uncertainty preferences and its associated worst-case distribution. With this distribution in
hand, I can calibrate risk aversion in Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) preferences using
detection error probabilities as proposed by Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) and Hansen
1Hansen and Marinacci (2016) summarize the connection between Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) multiplier pref-
erence approach to model uncertainty that I adopt here and other “variational preferences” (Maccheroni, Marinacci,
and Rustichini 2006) such as the multiple priors of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and smooth ambiguity of Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). Hansen and Sargent (2010) provide a discussion of the link between their multiplier
preference and Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) multiple priors. Ju and Miao’s (2012) generalized smooth ambiguity
preferences nests these variational preferences as special cases from a risk sensitive and ambiguity (vis-a-vis unobserv-
able states) perspective.
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and Sargent (2007). From the lens of model uncertainty, decreases in risk aversion in Epstein and
Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) risk-sensitive preferences can be interpreted as a reduction in model
uncertainty tempered by an increase in pessimism in the form of an overweighting of the probability
of the worst case model. This overweighting of events vis-a-vis objective probabilities relates to
the choice-theoretic framework of Quiggin (1982) and results here from the generalized alternative
entropy measure and its associated subadditivity of probabilities, the latter found also in Gilboa
(1987) and Schmiedler (1989). In an application of subadditivity to investment, Dow and Werlang
(1992) emphasize that expectations formed under probabilities that do not sum to one reflect both
agent’s uncertainty and aversion thereto.
Applying the preferences to a standard RBC model2 under random walk with drift productivity
and using the perturbation-based solution and sampling techniques of Bidder and Smith (2012), I
find that both Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) original formulation and the model uncertainty formu-
lation for Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) behave comparably for a given detection error
probability with respect to both macroeconomic and asset pricing variables. Examining the worst
case density associated with the different specifications, I find that agents with Hansen and Sar-
gent’s (2007) formulation fear autocorrelated productivity growth with a lower mean but reduced
volatility,3 those with Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) preferences autocorrelated produc-
tivity growth with a higher mean but increased volatility, and those with the generalized model
uncertainty preferences I introduce here autocorrelated productivity growth with a lower mean and
increased volatility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I formulate a general dynamic
model and derive the specific conditions under which Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990)
risk-sensitive preferences and Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) model uncertainty are equivalent. I then
turn to the measure of entropy behind model uncertainty and present the generalized measure in
section 3. In section 4, I apply this measure to the general dynamic model, derive conditions that
2I follow Tallarini’s (2000) specification of the RBC model and twist the continuation utility value according to the
different certainty equivalents I derive here. See Bidder and Smith (2012) for a model uncertainty RBC model with
investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, stochastic volatility, and labor wealth effect sensitive period
utility and Ilut and Schneider (2014) for a model uncertainty New Keynesian model with confidence shocks. Backus,
Ferriere, and Zin (2015) provide a thorough analysis of variants of a standard RBC model under risk and ambiguity.
3This result is broadly consistent with other studies: Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009), Bidder and Smith (2012),
Ellison and Sargent (2015), Bidder and Drew-Becker (2016) all find that the worst case is associated with lower mean
growth.
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recover both Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) risk-sensitive preferences as well as Hansen
and Sargent’s (2007) original model uncertainty framework, assess atemporal risk aversion in all
three frameworks, and examine the asset pricing implications of the generalized model uncertainty
specification. I then apply the generalized model uncertainty to an otherwise standard RBC model
in section 5 and examine the asset pricing and macroeconomic performance of all three frameworks.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Dynamic Model
In this section, I will lay out a general dynamic model. I review the risk sensitive preferences of
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) and the model uncertainty multiplier preferences of Hansen
and Sargent (2007), as well as the conditions under which the two coincide.
I will consider a recursive dynamic model where a time-invariant transition density
p(x′,x,a)(1)
gives the joint distribution of the future state, x′ ∈ X , the current state, x ∈ X , and an x measurable
control variable, a ∈ A. Thus, the probability distribution over the sequence of states, or model, is
determined by
pi(x′,x)
.
= p(x′,x,a(x))(2)
the control variable, a, is chosen to maximize lifetime utility expressed recursively following Kreps
and Porteus (1978) as
V (x) = max
a∈A
T (u,R (V ))(x)(3)
where T is a time aggregator and R a risk aggregator, or certainty equivalent.
The popular risk sensitive preference specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) is
a constant elasticity time and risk preference formulation, given by
V (x) = max
a∈A
[
(1−β)u(x,a(x))1−ρ +β
(∫
V (x′)1−γ p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
) 1−ρ
1−γ


1
1−ρ
(4)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and, with respect to u(x,a(x)), ρ is the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution and γ the coefficient of relative risk aversion.4 In this case, R (V )(x)
4Both of these measures are expressed here with respect to the period utility kernel u(x,a(x)) and are misnomers
if u(x,a(x)) 6= C(x), where C(x) is the agent’s current consumption. See especially, Swanson (2012a) and Swanson
(2012b) for measures of relative risk aversion with alternative period utility kernels and under recursive preferences. I
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is a power certainty equivalent E
[
V (x′)1−γ|x
] 1
1−γ
.
Standard expected utility can be recovered using the transformation ˜V (x) .= V (x)1−ρ) and the
limiting case of γ = ρ
lim
γ→ρ
˜V (x) = max
a∈A
(1−β)u(x,a(x))1−ρ+β
∫
˜V (x′)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′(5)
In this case, R ( ˜V )(x) is the conditional expectations operator E
[
˜V (x′)|x
] .
=
∫
˜V (x′)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′.
The risk aggregator, R (V )(x), can also be given a model uncertainty interpretation using the
tools of robust control following Hansen and Sargent (2007). In this approach, agents have a pref-
erence for robustness; i.e., their decisions are tempered by a fear of model misspecification. This
fear is formalized by bounds, derived by a min-max utility approach, on value functions over a set
of models. This set is constrained by limiting or penalizing alternative models considered by the
agent according to their relative entropy measured vis-a-vis the agent’s baseline, or approximating,
model. This provides the modeler a disciplined departure from rational expectations, as agents can
have a common approximating model shared with nature, yet demonstrate an ex post divergence by
tempering their decisions on the worst-case model.
Formally, an agent has preferences in the form of (3) given by
V (x) = max
a∈A
u(x,a(x))+βR (V )(x)(6)
where the aggregator R (V )(x) is derived by considering an agent who entertains a distorted model
p˜(x′,x,a(x))(7)
close to the approximating model, the probability distribution common to other specifications (2).
The likelihood ratio between the distorted and approximating models is
g(x′,x) .=
p˜(x′,x,a(x))
p(x′,x,a(x))
(8)
and the discrepancy between the two models will be calculated as the expected value of this ratio,
i.e., their relative entropy or the Kullback-Leibler divergence,∫
ln
(
g(x′,x)
)
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′(9)
The aggregator R results from a robustness consideration that selects the density for evaluating the
maintain this misnomer here for expositional expediency.
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continuation value as5
R (V )(x) .= min
p˜(x′,x,a(x))≥0∫
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′+θ
∫
ln
(
g(x′,x)
)
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′(10)
This is Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) multiplier preferences approach,6 which tempers the agent’s
decisions against models that are pernicious (i.e., reduce her expected continuation value) yet plau-
sible (i.e., are close to the baseline model in the sense of small relative entropy). The worst case
model, p˜, that solves the minimization problem balances these two goals, where θ controls how
much weight is assigned to the entropy goal. If this weight is infinite, p˜ is identical to p and R
becomes the conditional expectation operator.
For a finite θ, however, the minimizing model, p˜, will differ from the approximating model, p.
Rearranging the likelihood ratio, (8), the minimizing model can be expressed as
p˜(x′,x,a(x)) = g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))(12)
where the likelihood ratio, g, distorts the approximating model, p, to give the minimizing model p˜.
Solving the minimization problem, (10), gives
g(x′,x) =
exp
[
−1θV (x
′)p(x′,x,a(x))
]
∫
exp
[
−1θV (x′)p(x′,x,a(x))
]
dx′
(13)
as the minimizing distortion. Here, future states x′ associated with a lower than average (under the
approximating model, p) continuation value are assigned a higher probability (g(x′,x) > 1) than
under the approximating model and those x′ associated with a higher than average (again, under
the approximating model) continuation value a lower probability (g(x′,x) < 1) than under the ap-
proximating model. This distortion of the approximating probability measure is proportional to the
expected continuation value, or an agent concerned with the robustness of her decisions operates
under the hypothesis that “events occur with probabilities in inverse proportion to their desirability.”
Hansen and Sargent (2007), following Bucklew (2004), call this a “statistical version of Murphy’s
5A Bellman-Isaacs condition enables the minimization and maximization operators to be interchanged in formulating
the zero-sum game that underlies the selection of the minimizing density, see Hansen and Sargent (2007).
6More direct, yet, mathematically less expedient is the constraint preferences approach
R (V )(x) .= min∫
ln(g(x′,x)) p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′≤η
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′(11)
whereby the agent makes her decision rule robust to unstructured uncertainty contained inside the hyperball with a radius
η centered around her approximating model. η thus measures the amount of uncertainty facing an agent. Hansen and
Sargent (2001) provide conditions under which this constraint approach is evuivalent to the multiplier approach I use
here.
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Law.” Substituting the minimizing distortion, g, back into the minimization problem, (10), gives
R (V )(x) =−θ ln
∫
exp
[
−
1
θV (x
′)p(x′,x,a(x))
]
dx′(14)
an exponential certainty equivalent. With this certainty equivalent, (6) can be written as
V (x) = max
a∈A
u(x,a(x))−θβ ln
∫
exp
[
−
1
θV (x
′)p(x′,x,a(x))
]
dx′(15)
Standard expected utility is recovered in the limiting case of θ→ ∞
lim
θ→∞
−θ ln
∫
exp
[
−
1
θV (x
′)p(x′,x,a(x))
]
dx′ =
∫
V (x′)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
In this case, R ( ˜V )(x) is the conditional expectations operator E
[
˜V (x′)|x
] .
=
∫
˜V (x′)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′.
The recursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) lead to a power certainty
equivalent, see (4), whereas those of Hansen and Sargent (2007) lead to an exponential certainty
equivalent, see (14). As has been demonstrated by, e.g., Tallarini (2000), Barillas, Hansen, and
Sargent (2009), and Ju and Miao (2012), the two are closely related under special restrictions on the
parameters and the period utility function. I review this in the following proposition
Proposition 2.1. Logarithmic Equivalence of Risk Sensitive and Model Uncertainty Preferences
If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in (4) is one, the period utilities are related through a
logarithmic transformation
uHS(x,a(x)) = ln
(
uEZ(x,a(x))
)(16)
and
−θ = 1
(1−β)(1− γ)(17)
then
V HS(x) =
1
1−β ln
(
V EZ(x)
)(18)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Risk sensitive and uncertainty averse preferences coincide but only in the special case of an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one and a logarithmic relationship between the period
utility functions. Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2005) have pointed out that is an unresolved question
how these two preference relate under more general settings. Addressing this question means finding
a foundation that recovers both exponential and power certainty equivalents as special cases. I will
take the model uncertainty perspective and accomplish exactly this by generalizing the measure of
entropy used to compared alternate models.
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3 Generalized Entropy
To provide a model uncertainty framework that moves beyond the exponential certainty equivalent of
Hansen and Sargent (2007) demands that we move past the standard logarithmic relative entropy to
measure the distance between two models. I follow the the physics literature on statistical mechanics
and replace the standard Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon measure of entropy with the generalization
introduced by Tsallis (1988). After introducing the basic properties and intuition, I turn to the
associated measure of relative entropy and compare its properties with those of the standard measure
of relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence.
The standard Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon measure of entropy
S1(p(x))
.
=−
∫
p(x) ln p(x)dx(19)
where the meaning of the subscript in S1 will become apparent shortly, is used in the context of
information theory, see, e.g., Cover and Thomas (1991), as a measure of the expected information
content7 of a realization from the distribution p(x)—that is, the expected surprisal or unpredictability
of a distribution.
The uniqueness theorems of Shannon and Khinchin8 provide an axiomatic foundation for the
function in (19) and prove that its functional form uniquely satisfies their set of axioms. If their
axioms are modified to pseudoadditivity9 and biased probabilities pq,i = pq1,i, then there exists an
unique measure of entropy for all real values of q, the entropic index.
This measure, introduced by Tsallis (1988), is given by
Sq(p(x))
.
=−
∫ (1− p(x)q
1−q
)
dx =−
∫
p(x)q lnq p(x)dx(20)
where the generalized q-logarithm, lnq, is defined as
lnq (x)
.
=
x1−q−1
1−q
(21)
It is useful to define the inverse function of lnq, the generalized q-exponential function,
expq (x)
.
= [1+(1−q)x]
1
1−q(22)
Note that both (21) and (22) can be extended over their removable singularities at q = 1 to give the
standard base e logarithm and exponential function as limiting cases, ln1 (x) = ln(x) and exp1 (x) =
7This follows analogously, mathematically and conceptually, with the origin of the term “entropy” as the transfor-
mation content in classical thermodynamics and uncertainty or “mixedupness” in statistical mechanics.
8See Tsallis (2009, Ch. 2).
9For two independent subsystems A and B, pseudoadditivity results in Sq(A + B) = Sq(A) + Sq(B) + (1 −
q)Sq(A)Sq(B), where standard additivity results in the limiting case limq→1 Sq(A+B) = S1(A)+ S1(B).
7
exp(x). Thus, Tsallis’s (1988) entropy recovers (19) as a limiting case, generalizing Boltzmann-
Gibbs-Shannon entropy.
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Figure 1: q Entropy or Generalized Expected Surprise
magenta—q = 0.1, red—q = 0.5, black—q = 1, blue—q = 2, green—q = 10
Figure 1 depicts the generalized entropy (20) for a two state system.10 The first feature to note
is that entropy is concave for all the values of q depicted here; more generally, (20) is concave for
q > 0 and convex for q < 0, see Tsallis (1988) and Tsallis (2009, Ch.3). When the probability of
either of the two states is one (p = 0 or p = 1), entropy is zero as the probability one event will
happen with certainty and there is, thus, no expected surprisal. Note that this holds regardless of
the value of the entropic index, q. As can be seen in figure 1, the expected surprisal is decreasing
in q; that is, if q > 1 then entropy is less than in the standard Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon case and
if q < 1 entropy is greater. The entropic index can be interpreted as biasing standard probabilities
following Tsallis, Mendes, and Plastino (1998), Tsallis (2003), and Tsallis (2009, Ch. 3) and, as
noted above, from the generalization of the Shannon-Khinchin uniqueness theorems. Indeed as a
probability is positive and less than one, 0≤ pi ≤ 1, pqi ≥ pi for q < 1 and p
q
i ≤ pi for q > 1. Thus,
under biased probabilities, one expects more (less) surprisal from a realization of random variable
when q < 1 (q > 1). The total probability under the biased probabilities is depicted in figure 2a
and clearly shows an increase (decrease) in expected surprisal with q < 1 (q > 1) stemming from an
increase (decrease) in total probability. Following Schmiedler (1989) and Dow and Werlang (1992),
10That is, the probability of state one is given by p and that of state two by 1− p. Of course, the continuous measures
above and investigated afterwards are replaced by their discrete counterparts for this example. See Tsallis (2009).
8
q > 1 can be interpreted as a situation of uncertainty from the perspective of objective probabilities.
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(b) Probabilities of Escort Distribution
Figure 2: Biased Probabilites
magenta—q = 0.1, red—q = 0.5, black—q = 1, blue—q = 2, green—q = 10
To preserve the law of total probability, an escort distribution can be defined
pq(x)
.
=
p(x)q∫
p(x)qdx(23)
which normalizes the biased probabilities by the total probability from above. For the two state sys-
tem, figure 2b plots the probabilities of the escort distribution as a function of the initial probability
for different values of the entropic index. As can be seen, the entropic index favors—i.e., increases
the probability of—less likely events if q < 1 and overweights more likely events if q > 1, see also
Tsallis, Mendes, and Plastino (1998), Tsallis (2003), and Tsallis (2009, Ch. 3). In contrast to the
standard expectations operator with respect to the density p(x)
E p [x] .=
∫
xp(x)dx(24)
the escort distribution gives a q-generalization of the expectations operator with respect to the density
p(x)
E pq [x]
.
=
∫
x
p(x)q∫
p(x)qdxdx(25)
As shown by Abe and Bagci (2005), this definition of expectation is intricately linked to the func-
tional form of entropy, and this escort expectation leads to a q-generalization of relative entropy that
I will turn to next.
When comparing two distributions, relative entropy or the Kullback-Leibler divergence of p˜(x)
9
with respect to the reference distribution p(x)
I1 (p˜(x), p(x))
.
=
∫
p˜(x) ln p˜(x)
p(x)
dx(26)
provides a consistent method of discriminating between two probability distributions by quantifying
distance between the two distributions.11 This can be q-generalized following Tsallis (1988), Abe
and Bagci (2005), and Tsallis (2009, Ch. 3) as
Iq (p˜(x), p(x))
.
=
∫
p(x)
(
p˜(x)
p(x)
)q
lnq
(
p˜(x)
p(x)
)
dx(27)
and is positive and convex (both jointly and individually in p˜(x) and p(x), see Abe and Bagci (2005),
for q > 0.
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(a) q-Relative Entropy
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(b) ∂∂ p˜(x) of q-Relative Entropy
Figure 3: q-Relative Entropy or Generalized Kullback-Leibler Divergence
magenta—q = 0.1, red—q = 0.5, black—q = 1, blue—q = 2, green—q = 10
p(x) = 0.5—Two State Equiprobable
Figure 3a plots (27) for a two state random variable over possible values of p˜ for differing
values of the entropic index with the baseline distribution given by the equiprobable case. When
the two distributions match (p˜ = p = 0.5), relative entropy is zero. Elsewhere, entropy is positive
and increasing in the entropic index. For q > 1 (q < 1), relative entropy is greater (less) than the
Kullback-Leibler divergence. Figure 3b plots the derivative with respect to p˜, which also varies
with q. Note that for the case q = 2, the derivative is linear in p˜ given by − 21−p +
2
p(1−p) p˜. Thus,
the entropic index does more than just scale standard relative entropy, but also changes the margin.
Figure 4 provides the same picture, but now p = 0.75, as can be deduced by the point of zero relative
11Though it is not a metric, as it and the generalization that follows are not symmetric, see Tsallis (1998).
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entropy. This change not only shifts the picture from before to the right, but also tilts the measures
to the right, as can be confirmed using the linear relationship for the q = 2 case above.
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(a) q-Relative Entropy
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(b) ∂∂ p˜(x) of q-Relative Entropy
Figure 4: q-Relative Entropy or Generalized Kullback-Leibler Divergence
magenta—q = 0.1, red—q = 0.5, black—q = 1, blue—q = 2, green—q = 10
p(x) = 0.75—Two State Nonequiprobable
Again, (27) is a generalization of the standard measure, and the Tsallis (1988) q measure general-
izes the standard measure, the relative entropy or the Kullback-Leibler divergence, of discriminating
between two distributions.
4 Generalized Multiplier Preferences
The decision maker’s desire for robustness is formulated as a two player zero sum game, min-max
utility, with a minimizing agent, who selects a probability distribution to minimize the decision
maker’s payoff given her decision or policy function. The decision maker, of course, takes this into
account when formulating her decision function. My generalization replaces Hansen and Sargent’s
(2005) and Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) Boltzmann-Gibbs-Shannon measure of entropy with the
generalized form in (27) from the previous section and allows for a state-dependent weight on the
11
entropy penalty,
R (V )(x) .= min
p˜(x′,x,a(x))≥0∫
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′
+
∫
θ(x′)
(
p˜(x′,x,a(x))
p(x′,x,a(x))
)q−1
lnq
(
p˜(x′,x,a(x))
p(x′,x,a(x))
)
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′(28)
The first term evaluates continuation utility, conditioning on the current state x, under the distorted
density. The second term is the generalized relative entropy, conditional on x, of the distorted density
to the approximating model, reweighted with θ(x′). Indeed, if θ(x′) is independent of x′, say θ(x′) =
θ, this term becomes θIq (p˜(x′,x,a(x)), p(x′,x,a(x))|x).
In terms of the likelihood ratio, g(x′,x), and the decision maker’s approximating model, p(x′,x,a(x)),
the foregoing can be reformulated as
R (V )(x) .= min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
+
∫
θ(x′)g(x′,x)q lnq
(
g(x′,x)
)
p(x′,x,a(x))dx′(29)
The likelihood ratio can apparently be interpreted as a distortion to the probability density of the
approximating model and distortions are penalized by their entropy weighted by the approximating
density. This minimization problem weighs two countervailing forces: the decision maker would
like to guard against very painful distortions (those that result in the smallest expected value of
her continuation utility,
∫
V (x)g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx); on the other hand, a very pernicious distor-
tion that is easy to distinguish, i.e., is far, from her approximating model is considered less likely
and adds a large entropy contribution to her objective function (∫ p(x′,x,a(x))g(x′,x) lng(x′,x)dx),
where θ(x′) weights her concern for closeness. Thus, the decision maker is worried that her mis-
specification is both pernicious and hard to detect.
Specifically, I will set the multiplier, θ(x′), equal to a constant and a term proportional to the
continuation utility.
Assumption 4.1. Entropy Multiplier
The multiplier θ(x′) is given by
θ(x′) .= θ+(q−1)V (x′)(30)
where θ and q are positive.
For q > 1, this multiplier weights future states associated with higher continuation values more
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strongly; thus, for two competing distorted densities that are equally far from the approximating
model, the density associated with a lower continuation value is penalized relatively less. Increas-
ing q increases (q−1)V (x′) which tilts the minimizing agent’s decision further towards pernicious
distributions relative to the q = 1 case. Increasing q, though, also has a countervailing effect: it
increases the index in relative entropy, thereby increasing the penalty associated with distorting the
probability distribution. Hence changes in q might be interpreted as changes in the shape and not
necessarily size of the space of distorted models that agents consider.
This assumption on the multiplier allows me to reformulate the zero-sum game expressed in
terms of the likelihood ratio, g(x′,x), as the sum of an entropy penalty with a constant multiplier and
a continuation value evaluated under a weighted worst case density
R (V )(x) = min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫ (
V (x′)+θ lnq
(
g(x′,x)
))
p(x′,x,a(x))g(x′,x)qdx
(31)
= min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)q−1 p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx+θIq
(
p˜(x′,x,a(x)), p(x′,x,a(x))|x
)(32)
Thus q is not only the entropic index used in selecting the measure of entropy used to penalize
worst case density functions (the second term in the second line), but also expresses a form of
pessimism. The formulation of Hansen and Sargent (2005) and others with standard Boltzmann-
Gibbs-Shannon entropy would set this power to 1, yielding expectations taken with respect to the
distorted density p˜(x′,x,a). For q > 1, events made more likely under the worst case density are
overweighted and those made less likely underweighted when evaluating the expectation of the
continuation value under the worst case density (the first term in the second line). Quiggin (1982)
deems agents pessimistic if they overweight the probabilities of the worst outcomes on average and if
q > 1 agents will overweight the events in the distorted model chosen to minimize their continuation
utility. In this sense, I interpret q as a measure of agents’ pessimism. The resulting minimizing
probability distortion is contained in the following
Proposition 4.2. Minimizing Distortion and Risk-Sensitive Operator
For the generalized entropy measure and multiplier, the minimizing probability distortion is given
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by
g(x′,x) =
expq
(
−1θV (x
′)
)
expq
(
−1θ R (V )(x)
) = ( θ− (1−q)V (x′)θ− (1−q)R (V )(x)
) 1
1−q
(33)
and the risk aggregator, or certainty equivalent, by
R (V )(x) =−θ lnq
[∫
expq
(
−
1
θV (x
′)
)
p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
]
(34)
=
θ−
[∫
(θ− (1−q)V (x′))
1
1−q p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
]1−q
1−q
(35)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, the varying multiplier and generalized entropy lead to a generalized exponential transfor-
mation governed jointly by the entropic index q and static multiplier θ for the risk aggregator. This
contrasts with the standard exponential transformation controlled by the static multiplier θ that re-
sults from Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) formulation and the power certainty equivalent from Epstein
and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990). The interpretation of this generalized form follows more readily
from the special cases that capture these two specific preferences.
4.1 Equivalence with Hansen-Sargent Multiplier Preferences
In the extensive limit of the multiplier, limq→1 θ(x′) = θ, the model uncertainty specification and
Hansen and Sargent (2007) is recovered
lim
q→1
R (V )(x) =−θ ln
[∫
exp
(
−
1
θV (x
′)
)
p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
]
(36)
with an exponential certainty equivalent following proposition 4.2 and a minimizing distortion
gHS(x′,x) =
exp
(
−1θV (x
′)
)
exp
(
−1θR (V )(x)
)(37)
that tilts the distorted model using the standard exponential function.
This formulation is Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) aggregator,
R (V )(x) .= min
p˜(x′,x,a(x))≥0∫
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
E p˜
[
V (x′)|x
]
+θI1
(
p˜(x′,x,a(x)), p(x′,x,a(x))|x
)(38)
= min
p˜(x′,x,a(x))≥0∫
p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′+θ
∫
p˜(x′,x,a(x)) ln p˜(x
′,x,a(x))
p(x′,x,a(x))
dx′(39)
Both the expectation and the relative entropy are with respect to x′, conditioning on x. In terms of the
likelihood ratio, g(x′,x), and the decision maker’s approximating model, p(x′,x,a(x)), the foregoing
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can be reformulated as
R (V )(x) .= min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
Eg·p
[
V (x′)+θ ln
(
g(x′,x)
)](40)
= min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′+θ
∫
p(x′,x,a(x))g(x′,x) lng(x′,x)dx′
(41)
From the perspective of (31), the formulation here provides decision makers with uncertainty
in the modelling sense inasmuch as they entertain deviations from their approximating model. As
they use the implied probability distribution of this worst case model, they are not pessimistic in the
sense that they do not over- or underweight the ensuing probability distortions.
4.2 Equivalence with Epstein-Zin-Weil Risk Sensitive Preferences
In the proportional limit of the multiplier, limq→1 θ(x′) = θ, the risk sensitive specification of Epstein
and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) is recovered
lim
θ→0
R (V )(x) =
[∫
V (x′)
1
1−q p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
]1−q
(42)
with a power certainty equivalent. Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2005, p. 341) restrict 11−q < 1 which
translates to q ∈ [−∞,0]∪ [1,∞]. The coefficient of relative risk aversion from (4), γ, is related to q
through γ = − q1−q and values of q ≥ 1 translate to γ ≥ 1. I will confirm this and provide a measure
for risk aversion in the general case in the next section.
Following proposition 4.2 the minimizing distortion associated with Epstein-Zin-Weil prefer-
ences is
gEZW (x′,x) =
(
V (x′)
R (V )(x)
) 1
1−q
=
(
V (x′)
R (V )(x)
)1−γ
(43)
a power tilting instead of the exponential tilting of Hansen-Sargent preferences. Having this mini-
mizing distortion will enable me to parameterize their measure of relative risk aversion, γ, in Epstein-
Zin-Weil preferences from a model uncertainty perspective using detection error probabilities.
From the perspective of (31), note that the θ = 0 specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) and
Weil (1990) gives
R (V )(x) = min
g(x′,x)>0∫
g(x′,x)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′=1
∫
V (x′)g(x′,x)q−1 p˜(x′,x,a(x))dx′(44)
To interpret this, note that if q = 1, the minimizing agent would choose an infinitely pernicious
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distortion p˜(x′,x,a(x)) to minimize R (V )(x). For q > 1, this tendency is counterbalanced by the
overweighting through q, as making pernicious events more likely increases the value under the
integral by increasing g(x′,x) .= p˜(x
′,x,a(x))
p(x′,x,a(x)) . Recall that q can be interpreted as agents’ pessimism:
increases in q lead agents to attribute a higher probability to a given pernicious distortion and to
more strongly robustify their actions against this distortion, thereby reducing its impact on their
continuation value.
4.3 Atemporal Risk Aversion
To link the generalized model uncertainty to concepts of risk, I will examine the risk-related prop-
erties of the generalized preferences in a static setting. Abusing notation to minimize clutter by
suppressing the dependence on x, the current state, and recycling notation by relabeling the future
state, x′, with x, the risk aggregator from proposition 4.2 is
R (V ) =−θ lnq
(∫
expq
(
−
1
θV (x)
)
p(x)dx
)
(45)
and its minimizing density distortion is
g(x) =
expq
(
−1θV (x)
)
expq
(
−1θR (V )
)(46)
Backus, Routledge, and Zin (2005) calculate the risk aversion with a Taylor expansion of several
preferences in a two state equiprobable setup. Accordingly, let there be two states, with outcomes
x1 = 1+σ and x1 = 1−σ for positive σ. The certainty equivalent is
R (V ) =−θ lnq
(
0.5expq
(
−
1+σ
θ
)
+0.5expq
(
−
1−σ
θ
))
(47)
which I will evaluate locally around σ = 0 out to second order12
R (V )≈ R (V )
∣∣∣
σ=0
+
∂R (V )
∂σ
∣∣∣
σ=0
+
1
2
∂2R (V )
∂σ2
∣∣∣
σ=0
= 1− qθ+q−1
σ2
2
(48)
As there is no term linear in σ, risk aversion is second order here. This is not surprising as the
generalized exponential risk sensitive preferences are smooth, lacking the kinks responsible for first
order risk aversion, see, e.g., Epstein and Zin (1990). The term
q
θ+q−1(49)
provides a measure of risk aversion.
In the special case of a power certainty equivalent following Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s
12Details of the calculations can be found in the Appendix.
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(1990) risk-sensitive preferences, θ is set to zero and the foregoing measure of risk aversion is
q
θ+q−1
∣∣∣
θ=0
=−
q
1−q
(50)
Which, through comparison with (4) is equal to γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
For the exponential certainty equivalent of Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) robust control approach,
the entropic index q is set to one, which delivers the following measure of risk aversion
q
θ+q−1
∣∣∣
q=1
=
1
θ(51)
See also Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Tallarini (2000).
Returning to the general case in (49), the measure of risk aversion is increasing in θ for q > 0
∂ qθ+q−1
∂θ =
q
(θ+q−1)2
(52)
and decreasing in q for θ less than one, but increasing for θ greater than one
∂ qθ+q−1
∂q =−
1−θ
(θ+q−1)2
(53)
4.4 Asset Pricing
Consider a household seeking to maximize the following preferences Following
Vt = u(Ct ,•)−βθ lnq
(
Et
[
expq
(
−
1
θVt+1
)])
(54)
where Vt is the households lifetime discounted utility, u(Ct,•) its period utility function that depends
at least on consumption Ct , and β ∈ (0,1) the household’s subjective discount factor.
The likelihood ratio between the distorted and approximating models is given by
gt+1 =
expq
(
−1θVt+1
)
Et
[
expq
(
−1θVt+1
)](55)
The household’s stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel is given by
Mt+1
.
=
∂Vt/∂Ct+1
∂Vt/∂Ct
=
∂Vt
∂Vt+1
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
∂Vt
∂Ct
(56)
with
∂Vt
∂Ct
= uC(Ct ,•),
∂Vt+1
∂Ct+1
= uC(Ct+1,•)(57)
and
∂Vt
∂Vt+1
= β
(
expq
{
−1θVt+1
}
Et
[
expq
{
−1θVt+1
}]
)q
= βgqt+1 = βgt+1gq−1t+1(58)
combining yields the final form of the pricing kernel
Mt+1 = βuC(Ct+1,•)
uC(Ct ,•)
gt+1g
q−1
t+1 = Λ
R
t+1ΛUt+1ΛPt+1(59)
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where ΛRt+1
.
= βuC(Ct+1,•)
uC(Ct ,•) is the stochastic discount factor under expected utility (θ=∞), Λ
U
t+1
.
= gt+1
is the change of measure under the distorted model, and ΛPt+1
.
= gq−1t+1 captures the direct effect13 of
the entropic index.
Note that if q = 1, ΛPt+1 is equal to unity and the model uncertainty concerns collapse to Hansen
and Sargent’s (2007) original formulation (see section 4.1 above). For q > 1, agents overweight
(underweight) states that have become more (less) likely under the distorted model when pricing
assets, embedding a form of pessimism into a non-unity ΛPt+1. Thus, along with Hansen and Sar-
gent’s (2007), Bidder and Smith’s (2012), and others’ interpretation of stdt
(
ΛRt+1
)
/Et
[
ΛRt+1
]
and
stdt
(
ΛUt+1
)
as the market prices of risk and model uncertainty, respectively, I interpret stdt
(
ΛPt+1
)
/Et
[
ΛPt+1
]
as the market price of pessimism.
For Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) power certainty equivalent, θ → 0 (see section
4.2 above), and all three components of the stochastic discount factor remain. As the measure of
risk aversion is related inversely to q in this case, see section 4.3, an increase in risk aversion is
associated with a decrease in pessimism, as ΛPt+1 approaches unity,
5 Business Cycles, Asset Prices, and Model Uncertainty
In this section, I apply the generalized entropy constraint to a stochastic neoclassical growth model
with a preference for robustness. I will parameterize the model closely to the production model de-
scribed in Tallarini (2000). The economy is populated by an infinitely lived household that optimizes
over consumption Ct and labor supply Nt with the period utility function
Ut = lnCt +ψ ln(1−Nt)(60)
subject to
Ct +Kt =WtNt +RRKt Kt−1 +(1−δ)Kt−1(61)
where Kt is capital stock accumulated today for productive purpose tomorrow, Wt real wage, RRKt
the capital rental rate and δ ∈ [0,1] the depreciation rate. Investment is the difference between the
current capital stock and the capital stock in the previous period after depreciation
It = Kt − (1−δ)Kt−1(62)
I will assume a perfectly competitive production side of the economy, where output is produced
13The entropic index, as was shown above, enters into the change of measure g.
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using the labor augmented Cobb-Douglas technology Yt = Kαt−1
(
eZt Nt
)1−α
. Zt is a stochastic pro-
ductivity process and α ∈ [0,1] the capital share. Productivity is assumed to be a random walk with
drift
at ≡ Zt −Zt−1 = a+ εz,t , εz,t ∼ N (0,σ2z )(63)
with εz,t the innovation to Zt .
The model is detrended with
[
yt kt it ct wt
] .
= e−Zt
[
Yt Kt It Ct Wt
]
, where detrended
variables are written in lowercase.
The household’s lifetime utility function is expressed recursively using the generalized risk ag-
gregator R (V )(x) as
vt = lnct +ψ ln(1−Nt)+βR
(
vt+1 +
1
1−βat+1
)
(64)
= lnct +ψ ln(1−Nt)−βθ lnq
{
Et
[
expq
{
−
1
θ
(
vt+1 +
1
1−βat+1
)}]}
(65)
with β ∈ (0,1) the discount factor and vt the value function at the optimum. The first of household’s
two optimality conditions is the intratemporal labor supply/productivity condition equalizing the
utility cost of marginally increasing labor supply to the utility value of the additional consumption
ψ
1−Nt
=
1
ct
wt(66)
and the second is the intertemporal Euler equation, rearranged as the fundamental asset pricing
equation,
1 = Et [mt+1Rt+1](67)
where Rt
.
= RRKt + 1− δ is the return on capital and mt+1, the stochastic discount factor of the
household or pricing kernel (see section 4.4), is given by
mt+1
.
=
∂vt/∂Ct+1
∂vt/∂Ct
=
∂vt
∂vt+1
∂vt+1
∂ct+1 e
Zt+1
∂vt
∂ct e
Zt
(68)
with
∂vt
∂ct
=
1
ct
,
∂vt+1
∂ct+1
=
1
ct+1
(69)
and
∂vt
∂vt+1
= β

 expq
{
−1θ
(
vt+1 +
1
1−β at+1
)}
Et
[
expq
{
−1θ
(
vt+1 +
1
1−β at+1
)}]


q
(70)
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combining yields the final form of the pricing kernel
mt+1 = β ct
ct+1
eat+1

 expq
{
−1θ
(
vt+1 +
1
1−βat+1
)}
Et
[
expq
{
−1θ
(
vt+1 +
1
1−βat+1
)}]


q
(71)
The stationarized resource constraint is
ct + kt = yt +(1−δ)exp(−at)kt−1(72)
where yt = e−αat kαt−1N
1−α
t follows from profit maximization, with the stationarized wage wt =
(1−α)e−αat kαt−1N
−α
t and rental rate RRt = αe−(1−α)at kα−1t−1 N
1−α
t and the household’s budget con-
straint
ct + kt = wtNt +
(
1−δ+RRKt
)
exp(−at)kt−1(73)
closes the model.
I append the model with the following additional asset pricing variables: the real risk-free rate
R ft ≡ Et(mt+1)−1 and the (ex post) risk premium rpt = Rt −R ft−1 as the difference between the risky
and risk-free rate.
5.1 Data and Model Calibration
The calibration of the model will focus on matching the first two moments of key macroeconomic
indicators and the Sharpe ratio (see the upper and lower halves of table 1 respectively) for the U.S.
post war period.
The Sharpe ratio and the market price of risk std(mt+1)E[mt+1] that measures the excess return the house-
hold demands for bearing an additional unit of risk can be related through a Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and the fundamental asset pricing equation (here: 1 = Et [mt+1Rt+1] for the risky and
1 = Et [mt+1]R ft the risk free return) as∣∣∣E [Rt+1−R ft ]∣∣∣
std
(
Rt+1−R
f
t
) ≤ std (mt+1)
E [mt+1]
(74)
with the Sharpe ratio on the left hand side being empirically observable and given in the lower half
of table 1.
Table 2 contains the calibration of the model common to all specifications, where I follow Tal-
larini (2000) to maintain comparability (see the discussion there). The standard deviation of pro-
ductivity growth σa is set to match the post-war U.S. consumption growth volatility in table 1. The
remaining parameters, θ and q, will be set using detection error probabilities, following Hansen and
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Table 1: Data Moments, 1948:2-2012:4
Business Cycle Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt
∆ lnYt 0.004 0.991 1.000 0.380 0.266 0.045 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.005 0.566 0.571 0.255 0.201 0.069 0.531
∆ ln It 0.004 2.536 2.558 0.336 0.248 0.043 0.662
∆ lnNt 0.328 1.192 1.203 -0.020 -0.010 -0.008 0.388
lnNt — 2.778 2.802 0.999 0.998 0.997 -0.139
lnCt − lnYt -0.611 5.887 5.938 0.990 0.978 0.964 -0.172
ln It − lnYt -1.382 7.302 7.365 0.962 0.910 0.841 0.128
Asset Return Data
Return Mean Std. Dev.
R 2.13 8.26
R f 0.26 0.63
rp 1.87 8.27 Sharpe Ratio 0.2261
All business cycle data was retrieved from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
All returns are measured as net real quarterly percentage returns.
R is the return on the NYSE value weighted portfolio from the CRSP dataset and R f is the
secondary market rate on the three month Treasury bill. Both returns have been deflated
by the implicit deflator of the PCE Nondurables and Services series.
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter β ψ α δ a σa
Value 0.9926 ¯N = 0.2305 0.339 0.021 0.004 Std. Dev. ∆ lnct = 0.566%
See Tallarini (2000) and the main text.
Sargent (2007). Specifically, I will use a perturbation solution of the model following Bidder and
Smith (2012), but will use the nonlinear moving average policy function of Lan and Meyer-Gohde
(2013c) to maintain the stability of the model under nonlinearity.14 As proposed by Bidder and
Smith (2012), I will first generate simulations (the length of which will match the length of the post
war U.S. data series used) using the perturbation solution of the model and then perform a likelihood
ratio test over the agents’ approximating model p and the distorted model p˜. Second, I will generate
simulations from the distorted model using a sampling importance resampling algorithm and then
perform a symmetrical likelihood test.15
14See Lan and Meyer-Gohde (2013b) for a comparison of alternate, so-called pruning, algorithms to deliver this sta-
bility. An additional advantage to using a nonlinear moving average or pruning algorithm is that closed-form theoretical
moments are available, see Lan and Meyer-Gohde (2013a) and Andreasen, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ramı´rez
(2017), which can be used to initialize the particle filters.
15The likelihood calculations are performed by sequential importance sampling-resampling, or particle filtering, with
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A value of 0.5 for the detection error probability indicates that the two models (approximating
and worst-case) are indistinguishable, as the agents have a fifty-fifty chance of correctly identifying
the model used to generate the simulations. Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) argue for a detec-
tion error probability of between 0.15 and 0.2 as lower bound. I will take a conservative perspective
and target a detection error probability of 0.25.
5.2 Macroeconomic Implications
I begin by comparing the business cycle properties of model uncertainty following Hansen and
Sargent (2007) with q = 1 and the risk sensitive recursive utility specification of Epstein and Zin’s
(1989) and Weil’s (1990) parameterized via model uncertainty with θ = 0, before turning to the
case of the generalized model uncertainty. The calibrations follow the discussion above, where the
parameters q and θ are set according to the specification chosen and to achieve a detection error
probability of 0.25 between the approximating and worst case models of each specification. For the
generalized model uncertainty case, q is set to 2 (the reason for which will be clear in the next section
that addresses asset pricing implications) and θ is then set to match the detection error probability.
The volatility of productivity growth is adjusted under each preference specification such that the
volatility of consumption growth matches its empirical target in table 1. The approximating models
for all three specifications do a comparably good job in matching the data, despite their different
uncertainty specifications, consistent with what Backus, Ferriere, and Zin (2015) deem the “Tallarini
property”.
In the upper half of table 3, the business cycle moments for the approximating model are pre-
sented for the Hansen and Sargent (2007) specification (q = 0) with a detection error probability of
0.25 (which requires θ = 15). The approximating model does a reasonable job in matching the post
war U.S. macroeconomic experience, as can be seen by comparing with table 1.
The statistics of the worst case model that agents apparently fear can be found in lower half
of table 3. Compared to the approximating model, it can be seen that agents worry about an en-
vironment with lower average growth and positive autocorrelation in technology growth. This is a
familiar result of the model uncertainty framework, see, e.g., Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009)
with the long run risk result echoed by Bidder and Drew-Becker (2016). The detectability of the
a bootstrap proposal except where noted.
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Table 3: Business Cycle Moments, Hansen and Sargent (2007) Preferences
Approximating Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.004 1.029 1.000 0.009 0.008 0.008 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.004 0.566 0.550 0.085 0.080 0.076 0.988 0.984
∆ ln It 0.004 2.351 2.285 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 0.994 0.996
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.367 0.357 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023 0.983 0.988
lnNt -1.463 1.176 1.143 0.951 0.904 0.859 0.332 0.308
lnCt − lnYt -0.308 1.530 1.487 0.951 0.904 0.859 -0.332 -0.308
ln It − lnYt -1.330 4.271 4.152 0.951 0.904 0.859 0.331 0.307
∆ lnat 0.000 1.194 1.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Worst-Case Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.003 1.031 1.000 0.078 0.077 0.077 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.003 0.564 0.547 0.269 0.265 0.263 0.988 0.984
∆ ln It 0.003 2.413 2.341 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.994 0.996
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.370 0.359 -0.024 -0.024 -0.022 0.984 0.988
lnNt -1.471 1.195 1.160 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.328 0.305
lnCt − lnYt -0.298 1.552 1.506 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.329 -0.305
ln It − lnYt -1.357 4.497 4.363 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.328 0.304
∆ lnat -0.001 1.193 1.157 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.934 1.000
θ was set to 15 to deliver a detection error probability of 25%
worst case model with negative mean, positively autocorrelated technology growth is balanced with
a reduction in the volatility of technology shocks.
In the upper half of table 4, the business cycle moments for the approximating model are pre-
sented for the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) specification (θ = 0) with a detection error
probability of 0.25 (which requires q = 1.15). The results here are essentially identical to those
obtained under the approximating model under Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) standard model uncer-
tainty framework.
The lower half of table 4 contains the business cycle statistics of the worst case under the model
uncertainty foundation for the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) specification. In contrast to
the worst case under Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) standard model uncertainty framework, agents
here fear a technology process with increasing autocorrelations and a more volatile shock. This
leads to substantial increases in the autocorrelations of macroeconomic variables and an increase
in the volatility of consumption growth. The detectability of the worst case model is now balanced
with an increase in the average growth rate of the economy.
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Table 4: Business Cycle Moments, Epstein and Zin (1989) Preferences
Approximating Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.004 1.026 1.000 0.009 0.008 0.008 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.004 0.566 0.552 0.085 0.080 0.076 0.988 0.984
∆ ln It 0.004 2.360 2.301 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 0.994 0.996
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.365 0.356 -0.025 -0.024 -0.022 0.983 0.988
lnNt -1.467 1.166 1.137 0.951 0.904 0.859 0.333 0.309
lnCt − lnYt -0.304 1.516 1.478 0.951 0.904 0.859 -0.333 -0.309
ln It − lnYt -1.341 4.298 4.190 0.951 0.904 0.859 0.333 0.308
∆ lnat 0.000 1.191 1.161 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Worst-Case Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.005 1.025 1.000 0.207 0.206 0.208 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.005 0.568 0.554 0.496 0.493 0.492 0.988 0.984
∆ ln It 0.005 2.307 2.250 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.994 0.996
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.362 0.353 -0.026 -0.025 -0.021 0.983 0.987
lnNt -1.460 1.145 1.117 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.337 0.312
lnCt − lnYt -0.313 1.492 1.455 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.337 -0.312
ln It − lnYt -1.316 4.090 3.989 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.336 0.311
∆ lnat 0.001 1.193 1.164 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.932 1.000
q was set to 1.15 to deliver a detection error probability of 25%
The business cycle moments for the approximating model are presented in the upper half of
table 5 for the generalized model uncertainty specification with q = 2 and with a detection error
probability of 0.25 (this requires θ = 132.15). The results here are roughly comparable to those
obtained under the approximating model under Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) standard model un-
certainty framework and the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) specification. With agents
pessimistic, q > 1, their precautionary behavior is heightened, requiring an increase in the volatility
of technology growth (and with it output and the two margins, investment and labor, to smooth the
effects of output on consumption) to match the empirical volatility of consumption growth.
The lower half of table 5 contains the business cycle statistics of the worst case under the gen-
eralized model uncertainty specification with q = 2. Relative to the approximating model, both
mechanisms from above are operational, with technology growth having a lowered mean, increased
volatility, and heightened autocorrelation compared with the approximating model. The moments of
consumption growth, aside from the decrease in the mean here, are nearly identical to those under
Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) standard model uncertainty framework. Relative to the approximating
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Table 5: Business Cycle Moments, Generalized Uncertainty Preferences, q = 2
Approximating Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.004 1.233 1.000 0.008 0.008 0.007 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.004 0.566 0.459 0.101 0.096 0.091 0.977 0.974
∆ ln It 0.004 2.810 2.279 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 0.994 0.995
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.526 0.426 -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 0.985 0.987
lnNt -1.418 1.644 1.333 0.950 0.903 0.858 0.330 0.315
lnCt − lnYt -0.367 2.162 1.753 0.950 0.903 0.858 -0.330 -0.315
ln It − lnYt -1.162 4.955 4.017 0.951 0.903 0.859 0.330 0.316
∆ lnat 0.000 1.347 1.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Worst-Case Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. % Relative Autocorrelations Cross Corr. Cross Corr.Std. Dev. 1 2 3 w∆ lnYt w∆ lnat
∆ lnYt 0.003 1.240 1.000 0.047 0.045 0.046 1.000 1.000
∆ lnCt 0.003 0.565 0.456 0.270 0.264 0.260 0.977 0.974
∆ ln It 0.003 2.908 2.346 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 0.994 0.995
∆ lnNt 0.000 0.532 0.429 -0.024 -0.024 -0.022 0.985 0.987
lnNt -1.429 1.673 1.350 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.326 0.312
lnCt − lnYt -0.353 2.195 1.771 1.000 1.000 0.999 -0.326 -0.312
ln It − lnYt -1.195 5.281 4.260 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.325 0.312
∆ lnat -0.001 1.350 1.089 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.952 1.000
θ was set to 132.15 to deliver a detection error probability of 25%
model, consumption growth volatility goes down in the worst case model despite the increase in the
volatility of productivity growth and production, as the pessimistic agents here overweight (q > 1)
the probability of the worst case and robustify their decision rules more strongly.
Figure 5 plots the joint distributions of the two states, kt and ∆at , for the specifications of Epstein
and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), Hansen and Sargent (2007), and the generalized model uncertainty
introduced here. As can be seen in the figure, the mean shift in the distribution of technology growth
to the right (indicating higher average growth) is ameliorated by a downward shift in detrended
capital for the specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) relative to that of Hansen
and Sargent (2007). This downward shift along with the increased variability of technology growth
highlights that the agents are not necessarily “better off” in the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990) specification. The generalized model uncertainty specification with q = 2 is associated with
a large upward shift in detrended capital. This reflects the overaccumulation of capital (and with
it, drop in price through the decreased marginal productivity and increase in return) driven by the
agent’s overweighting the worst case scenario.
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Figure 5:
Red: Hansen and Sargent (2005); Blue: Epstein and Zin (1989); Green: Generalized Uncertainty
Joint unconditional distributions of states, a and k.
5.3 Asset Pricing Implications
I will first compare the specifications ability to match asset pricing facts, here using the market price
of risk, for varying detection error probabilities. This will highlight the close relationship between
Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) risk-sensitive specification and model uncertainty fol-
lowing Hansen and Sargent (2007) when examining empirically plausible market prices of risk for
this model. Then I will turn to the generalized model uncertainty introduced here and show that
increasing the entropic index q can put the model’s asset pricing predictions inside the Hansen and
Jagannathan (1997) bounds while maintaining a conservative detection error probability of 0.25.
Under the calibration in the previous section (specifically for detection error probabilities of
25%), both Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) and Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and Weil’s (1990) specifi-
cations yield market prices of risk of 0.1. This relation holds more generally, as can be seen in
figure 6, which plots the market price of risk of the approximating models against the detection er-
ror probabilities16 for the Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990)
16As the particle filter with a reasonable number of particles (1,000,000) still suffers from sampling variation when
calculating the likelihood tests for high and low detection error probabilities, I follow Bidder and Drew-Becker (2016)
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Figure 6: Red: Hansen and Sargent (2005); Blue: Epstein and Zin (1989)
Market Price of Risk and Detection Error Probabilities
specifications. For a detection error probability of 0.25, both specifications yield roughly the same
market price of risk of around 0.1. For very low detection error probabilities the specification of Ep-
stein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) and for very high detection error probabilities the specification
of Hansen and Sargent (2007) produces higher market prices of risk. That these two different speci-
fications yield very similar results when controlling for the detection error probabilities confirms the
close relation between these two different preference specifications for the model here.
Table 6: Entropic Index and the Market Price of Risk
q = 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5
MPR 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.27
θ is adjusted to keep the detection error probability at 0.25.
Holding the detection error probability constant at 25%, the generalized model uncertainty
present in this paper moves directly towards the bounds and enters them with a q = 2.25, as can
be seen in table 6. For the q = 2 specification of the previous section, the market price of risk is
0.21, just shy of the empirical Sharpe ratio of 0.2261, see the lower half of table 1, and more than
twice the value obtained under both Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) and Epstein and Zin’s (1989) and
and calculate the log-likelihood ratios directly from the perturbation approximated changes of measure g. This eliminates
the sampling variation and computational burden associated with the particle filter, but assumes that the entire state
vector is observable when comparing models. I found that this only slightly reduced the detection error probabilities
compared with calculations conditional on a subset of the models’ variables (i.e., consumption).
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Weil’s (1990) specifications. That agents overweight the probability of the worst case under the gen-
eralized model uncertainty formulation drives up the returns on risky capital relative to the risk free
bond. One could object to the fact the econometrician uses the actual likelihood ratio g when cal-
culating the detection error probabilities while the agents in the model overweight gq the worst case
when forming expectations, as perhaps overstating the results for the generalized model uncertainty
case. But note that this objection would then also apply to the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990) specification that operates solely through q: the approximate equivalence with Hansen and
Sargent’s (2007) specification in regards to the market prices of risk and detection error probabilities
in figure 6 rests likewise on this discord between the measures of the agents and the econometrician.
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Figure 7: The Hansen-Jagannathan Bounds
Hansen and Jagannathan (1997) extend the maximal Sharpe ratio point restriction on pricing
kernels to a parabola inside which pairs of std (mt+1) and E [mt+1] must reside to be consistent with
(a vector) of risky assets and the riskless bond. Figure 7a contains this bound for the assets in table 1
and both expected utility (θ = ∞ and q = 1) and for recursive utility using the exponential certainty
equivalent (q = 1 and varying θ). For the expected utility case, the risk-free rate puzzle can be seen
through the decrease in E [mt+1] with risk aversion is increased from 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and finally
to 100. By holding the elasticity of intertemporal substitution constant at one, Tallarini (2000) is able
to march up to the bounds, but only for a degree of risk aversion equal to 100. Under the Hansen
and Sargent (2005) interpretation, this degree of risk aversion is associated with a detection error
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probability of 5%, arguably past the limit of credulity.
From an asset pricing perspective, the approach of generalized model uncertainty is of interest
beyond its ability to provide a model uncertainty foundation for the Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1990) specification with arbitrary felicity functions. The combination of model uncertainty and
pessimism in the formulation of expectations by overweighting the probability of events made more
likely under the worse case brings the macroeconomic model’s predictions of the market price of
risk in line with empirical post war U.S. observations for reasonable detection error probabilities.
6 Conclusion
I have derived a generalization of the model uncertainty framework of Hansen and Sargent (2007),
using Tsallis’s (1988) generalized entropy. The resulting preferences recover Hansen and Sargent’s
(2007) original formulation with an exponential certainty equivalent as one special case and recover
the constant elasticity of substitution risk specification of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990)
with a power certainty equivalent as another. This latter result is particularly important, as it pro-
vides a model uncertainty foundation for Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) preferences with
arbitrary period utility functions (allowing, e.g., arbitrary intertemporal elasticities of substitution).
This is desirable as a small amount of model uncertainty can substitute for a high risk aversion, as
demonstrated by Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2009).
In an application to a standard RBC model, I find that both Hansen and Sargent’s (2007) original
formulation and the model uncertainty formulation for Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) pro-
vide roughly the same predictions for the market price of risk for plausible detection error probabil-
ities. Aside from these limiting cases, the generalization provides a two parameter model approach
to model uncertainty, with the new parameter induced by Tsallis’s (1988) generalized entropy, the
entropic index q, determining a form of pessimism that induces agents to overweight the worst case
model when forming expectations. As a result, increasing the entropic index (or increasing pes-
simism) leads to an increase in the market price of risk for a given detection error probability. The
empirical value of the market price of risk can be achieved with modest detection error probabilities
(25%) and a slightly elevated entropic index (q = 2). Future research will seek to discipline this new
parameter empirically.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in (4) to one (ρ = 1) and taking logs yields
ln((V EZ(x)) = (1−β) ln(uEZ(x,a(x)))+ β
1− γ ln
(∫
V EZ(x′)1−γ p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
)
Defining ˜V EZ(x) = ln((V
EZ(x))
1−β and dividing the foregoing by (1−β) gives
˜V EZ(x) = ln(uEZ(x,a(x)))+ β
(1−β)(1− γ) ln
(∫
exp ˜V EZ(x)(1−β)(1− γ)p(x′,x,a(x))dx′
)
comparison with (15) completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Abusing notation to minimize clutter by suppressing the dependence on x, the current state, and
recycling notation by relabeling the future state, x′, with x, the aggregator in (29) can be written as
˜V .= min
g(x)>0
∫
V (x)g(x)p(x)dx+
∫
θ(x)g(x)q lnq (g(x)) p(x)dx+λ
(∫
g(x)p(x)dx−1
)
(A-1)
where λ is the multiplier on the constraint that the distorted distribution be a distribution.
The first order condition is
0 =V (x)p(x)+θ(x)qg(x)q−1 lnq (g(x)) p(x)+θ(x)g(x)qg(x)−qp(x)+λp(x)(A-2)
which can be rearranged as
0 =V (x)p(x)+qθ(x)g(x)q−1 lnq (g(x)) p(x)+θ(x)p(x)+λp(x)(A-3)
Substituting the form of the entropy multiplier from assumption 4.1
θ(x) .= θ+(q−1)V (x)(A-4)
gives
0 = q
[
V (x)p(x)+θ(x)g(x)q−1 lnq (g(x)) p(x)
]
+θp(x)+λp(x)(A-5)
multiplying the foregoing with g(x)
0 = q
[
V (x)p(x)g(x)+θ(x)g(x)q lnq (g(x)) p(x)
]
+θg(x)p(x)+λg(x)p(x)(A-6)
rearranging
0 = q
[
V (x)p(x)g(x)+θ(x)g(x)q lnq (g(x)) p(x)+λ(g(x)p(x)−1)
]
+θg(x)p(x)+λg(x)p(x)(1−q)+qλ
(A-7)
and integrating over x yields
0 = q ˜V +θ+λ(A-8)
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Combining the foregoing, (A-8) with the first order condition, (A-5)
0 = q
[
V (x)− ˜V +θ(x)g(x)q−1lnq (g(x))
]
p(x)(A-9)
noting that p(x) and q are assumed nonzero gives
0 =V (x)− ˜V +θ(x)
(
1−g(x)q−1
)
1−q
(A-10)
which can be rearranged as
0 =V (x)− ˜V +θ
(
1−g(x)q−1
)
(1−q)
−V (x)
(
1−g(x)q−1
)(A-11)
and
0 = g(x)q−1V (x)− ˜V + θ
1−q
(
1−g(x)q−1
)(A-12)
multiplying the foregoing with17 1−qθ g(x)
1−q delivers
0 = (1−q)1θV (x)− (1−q)
1
θg(x)
1−q
˜V +g(x)1−q−1(A-13)
or
1− (1−q)
1
θV (x) = g(x)
1−q
(
1− (1−q)
1
θ
˜V
)
(A-14)
from which the minimizing likelihood ratio, g(x), follows as
g(x) =
(
1− (1−q) 1θV (x)
) 1
1−q(
1− (1−q) 1θ ˜V
) 1
1−q
=
expq
(
−1θV (x)
)
expq
(
−1θ
˜V
)(A-15)
and the minimizing, or worst-case, probability distribution is then
p˜(x) = p(x)
expq
(
−1θV (x)
)
expq
(
−1θ
˜V
)(A-16)
as was claimed in proposition 4.2.
Integrating both sides of the previous equation with respect to x gives
1 =
∫
p(x)
expq
(
−1θV (x)
)
expq(−1θ ˜V )
dx(A-17)
which, as ˜V is independent of x, can be written as
expq(−
1
θ
˜V ) =
∫
p(x)expq
(
−
1
θV (x)
)
dx(A-18)
yielding the risk aggregator or certainty equivalent
˜V =−θ lnq
[∫
expq
(
−
1
θV (x)
)
p(x)dx
]
(A-19)
as was claimed in proposition 4.2.
17Note that if θ = 0, the foregoing reduces to 0 = g(x)q−1V (x)− ˜V , which can be solved for the minimizing likelihood
ratio g(x) as g(x) =
(
V (x)
˜V
) 1
1−q
, which is the same as (A-15) with θ set to zero.
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A.3 Risk Aversion
R (V ) =−θ lnq
(
0.5expq
(
−
1+σ
θ
)
+0.5expq
(
−
1−σ
θ
))
=−θ
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−1+σθ
)] 1
1−q +0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−1−σθ
)] 1
1−q
)1−q
−1
1−q
(A-20)
∂R (V )
∂σ =−
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
+0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
)−q
×
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] q
1−q
−0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] q
1−q
)
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∂2R (V )
∂σ2 = q
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
+0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
)−q−1
×
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] q
1−q
−0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] q
1−q
)2
−
q
θ
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
+0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] 1
1−q
)−q
×
(
0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1+σ
θ
)] 2q−1
1−q
+0.5
[
1+(1−q)
(
−
1−σ
θ
)] 2q−1
1−q
)
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